SPRING 2008 COURSE DESCRIPTIONS
Phil. 141, Introduction to Philosophy Honors (Prof. Scott Jenkins,
10:00-10:50 MWF, 3097 Wescoe)
This course is an introduction to some of the central problems in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Questions we will consider include: What is knowledge, and what can we know? How is the mind related to the body? Are we responsible for our actions in a deterministic world? What constitutes survival over time? What does morality demand of us, and with what right? We will consider approaches to these questions suggested by contemporary philosophers and by central figures in the history of Western philosophy. The class will consist of short lectures followed by class discussion, and evaluation will be based on class participation in addition to students' papers and exams.
Phil. 148: Reason and Argument (Prof. Ben Eggleston, 12:00-12:50 MW, 3139 Wescoe)
An introduction to the theory and practice of logical analysis. Special emphasis will be placed on the logical appraisal of everyday arguments.
Phil. 181, Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy Honors (Prof. D. Darby, 11:00-12:15 TR, 3097 Wescoe)
What is the basis of our obligation to obey the law? Are we ever justified in disobeying the law? What is the nature of justice and why is it important? When is society justified in interfering with individual liberty? How should we understand human nature? And how do conceptions of human nature inform political philosophy? We will gain insight into these and other perennial philosophical questions by studying one of the greatest works of Western philosophy, Plato’s Republic. We will also read selections from other canonical philosophical works by Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and Marx. No prerequisites. Open only to students in the Honors Program or by consent of the philosophy department. The required text is Classics of Moral and Political Theory, Fourth Edition (Hackett, 2005), edited by Michael L. Morgan.
Phil. 560: Nineteenth Century Philosophy (Prof. Scott Jenkins, 2:00 - 2:50 MWF, 4008 Wescoe)
This course is a survey of 19th Century European philosophy. We will begin with a brief examination of Kant’s critical philosophy, which underlies a broad spectrum of 19th century concerns. We will then consider the work of those regard Kant’s work as unfinished (Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer), those who think his philosophical intentions are unrealizable (Kierkegaard), and those who find those intentions suspicious (Nietzsche). Topics to be considered include the nature of aesthetic experience, the grounds and limits of morality, the nature of religious faith, the importance of the social in an account of subjectivity, and questions of philosophical methodology.
Philosophy 622: Philosophy of Social Science (Prof. Ann Cudd,
9:30-10:45 TR,
3097 Wescoe)
This course explores philosophical issues in the social sciences. We begin with an overview of the basic questions: Do social structures determine individual human actions, or are individuals' actions ontologically primary? Are laws of human behavior possible? Is human behavior guided by rationality or by other forces? Is social science possible? Can social science be objective and universal? How can social science answer normative questions? Next we will look at specific types of models used in the social sciences, such as: the rational choice model of human behavior, used extensively in economic theory and now in political science and sociology; statistical models used in large-scale sociological and econometric theories; functionalist models of societies and social behavior used in anthropological and Marxist economic studies; psychoanalytic models of behavior that are frequently used in psychological, historical, and sociological research; and sociobiological models of behavior. In order to compare these kinds of explanatory and interpretive models, we will be reading a few pieces by social scientists that employ these models on a single question: why do humans wage wars?
Phil. 648: Theory of Knowledge (Prof. A. C. Genova, 2:30 - 3:45 TR, 4033 Wescoe)
*NOTE: This class begins on Tuesday, February 5 and will meet from 2:30-4:00 (not 2:30-3:45) throughout the remainder of the semester. The extra 15 minutes makes up for the five sessions that it does not meet prior to Feb 5.
This course satisfies one of the philosophy major requirements and can also be taken for graduate credit and to meet PhD distribution requirements. It focuses on one of the central, theoretical areas of philosophy, namely, Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology). Simply stated, in contrast to Metaphysics which focuses on what there is – what exists, Epistemology focuses on how we get to know what exists – how we achieve justified belief and knowledge.
Accordingly, the central problems that will concern us include the following:
Is knowledge possible at all? This is the challenge of skepticism.
What is knowledge? The problem of the analysis of knowledge.
What are the criteria and correct methods for epistemic justification? The major alternative theories of justification by means of which we achieve truth.
What counts as legitimate evidence for our beliefs? Perception, memory, reason, deduction, testimony?
What is the nature of truth? The major theories of truth.
Is complete certainty or necessary truth possible? The problem of a priori knowledge.
All of the assigned readings are from primary sources–selections from major philosophical works or journal articles–all of which are available in a single anthology. The course will be organized in terms of five modules consisting of approximately 250 pages in total:
I. THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM (72 pp)
II. KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD (42 pp)
III. THE ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE (30 pp)
IV. THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION (106 pp)
V. THE PROBLEM OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE (71 pp)
Required Text: Louis P. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, paperback, Wadsworth Press, 2003, 3rd edition. (In addition, there will be some pass-outs distributed by the instructor.)
Phil 672: History of Ethics (Prof. John Bricke, 11:00-12:15 TR, 4011 Wescoe)
We shall make a close study - interpretative, comparative, and critical - of four classic texts in the history of ethical theory, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (Book III, ‘Of Morals’) (1739), Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Mill’s Utilitarianism (1861). We will keep an eye open for connections to contemporary ethical theory, both in normative ethics and in metaethics (and with this in view will use Bernard Williams’s Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) as a supplementary text). All going well, the format will be lecture-cum-discussion. There will be three essay-style exams (none of them comprehensive). A term paper of moderate length (8-10pp) will be due at the end of the semester.
Phil 807 Aristotle: Moral Theory and Moral Psychology
(Prof. Thomas Tuozzo, 2:30 - 4:20 M, 3097 Wescoe)
In this course we shall examine Aristotle’s moral theory and his moral psychology. To that end we shall carefully read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and parts of his De Anima (On the Soul), Rhetoric, Eudemian Ethics, and Politics. Selected works of contemporary scholarship and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics will also be read.
In connection with his ethics, we shall investigate the fundamental notions of Aristotle’s moral theory: eudaimonia or happiness, virtue, practical wisdom, and friendship. Some of the questions we shall consider are: (a) what is the overall shape of Aristotle’s moral theory? In particular, how does the notion of the “good”, and the various kinds of good that Aristotle recognizes, figure in that theory? What room, if any, is there for the notion of moral obligation in Aristotle’s ethics? (b) to what extent, if at all, is Aristotelian eudaimonism an egoistic theory? What role do the interests of others have in Aristotle’s theory? In particular, what is Aristotle’s theory of friendship, and what is its role in Aristotle’s overall theory? (c) to what extent is Aristotle’s theory subject to the charge of cultural relativism? In particular, does Aristotle offer anything like a rational defense or justification of the virtuous life? (d) does Aristotle’s theory give us much guidance for action? If not, how serious a deficiency is that in his theory?
In connection with his moral psychology, we will be concerned with the Aristotelian notions of desire (and its divisions: rational desire, spirit, and appetite), deliberation, choice, voluntariness, and pleasure. Some of the questions we shall consider are: (a) what are Aristotle’s conditions for moral responsibility, with respect to (i) actions and (ii) states of character? To what degree, if at all, does Aristotle endorse something like freedom of the will? (b) how are belief and desire operative in the production of action? In particular, does belief of any sort (e.g., about the good) have any motive power, independent of desire? (c) what sorts of desires does the virtuous person have? What sorts of pleasure does she experience? (d) how is pleasure related to action? In what sense, if at all, can we be said to aim at pleasure? What sort of value does pleasure have? (e) how large is the scope of deliberation? Are ends in any sense subject to deliberation? (f) what sorts of weakness of will does Aristotle recognize? What are his accounts of those types of weakness of will?
Participants will give one or two half-hour seminar presentations, and produce a 15-20 page term paper. Preparation, attendance and informed discussion at weekly seminar meetings required.
Phil 880: Seminar in Ethics (Prof. John Bricke, 2:30-4:20 R, 3097 Wescoe)
The general topic with be metaethics. More specifically, we’ll focus on theories attempting to effect some significant connection between emotion (affective or conative states, or both) and truth in a characterization of moral judgments. (Having fairly recently done a seminar on Alan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism and Simon Blackburn’s projectivism, I propose not to focus on so-called expressivist theories of the kind they forward. I can’t believe, however, that expressivism will not come up for mention.)
More specifiically still, we shall focus on the work of David Wiggins (mainly essays from his volume Needs, Values, Truth (3rd ed., 1998)), John McDowell (essays from his Mind, Value, and Reality (1998)), and Donald Davidson (essays from his Problems of Rationality (2004)). After an initial survey of the terrain, participants in the seminar will take turns introducing the essays under consideration. A substantive term paper – reflective and critical – will be due at the end of the semester.
We shall start with Wiggins, and that will provide an opportunity for participants in the seminar to become familiar with his influential work prior to his coming as Lindley Lecturer in late March. (I hope we shall have an opportunity to have Wiggins participate in the seminar at that point.) Amongst the McDowell and Davidson papers we shall read are the Lindley Lectures for 1982 and 1987.
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